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ABSTRACT 
 
SECTORAL INFORMALITY IN TURKEY 
 
DALGIÇ, Yasin 
 
M.A., Department of Economics 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Selin SAYEK BÖKE 
 
February 2010 
        
This thesis evaluates the sectoral based probability of informal employment and its 
possible determinants. By decomposing the effects of workers’ characteristics and 
sectoral features on probability of informal employment, new measures of 
informality degrees of sectors are calculated. These new informality measures 
provide an easy and understandable interpretation and comparison across sectors. 
These new measures suggest that people who work in agriculture (includes 
agriculture, forestry and fishing) and construction sectors are more likely to be 
employed informally, while financial (financial intermediation, real estate, renting 
and business activities) and mining (mining and quarrying) sectors are relatively 
more formal in terms of employment. Additionally, among the determinants of 
differences in the probability of informal employment, the share of male workers and 
the amount of sectoral credits over GDP are found to be significant.  
 
Keywords: Informality, Social Security, Informality Differentials, Linear Probability 
Model, Feasible Generalized Least Square Method. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’DE SEKTÖREL KAYITDIŞILIK 
 
DALGIÇ, Yasin 
 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Selin Sayek Böke 
 
Şubat 2010 
 
Bu tez, Türkiye’deki sektörel bazda kayıtdışı istihdam olasılığını ve bunun olası 
nedenlerini incelemektedir. İşçi karakteristiklerinin ve sektörel özelliklerin 
ayrıştırılmasından sonra sektörlerin yeni kayıtdışılık düzeyleri hesaplanmıştır. Bu 
yeni kayıtdışılık ölçüleri, sektörler arasında kolay ve anlaşılabilir yorumlar 
yapılmasına imkân vermektedir. Bu yeni ölçülere bakıldığında, tarım (tarım, 
ormancılık ve balıkçılık) ve inşaat sektörlerinde çalışan insanların kayıtdışı 
çalıştırılmaya daha yatkın oldukları bulunmuştur. Ayrıca, finansal (finansal aracılık, 
ev sahipliği, kiralama ve ticari faaliyetler) sektör ve madenciliğin (madencilik ve 
taşocakçılığı) kayıtdışı istihdam açısından göreceli olarak daha formal olduğu göze 
çarpmaktadır. Ek olarak, sektörlerde kayıtdışı istihdam olasılığı farklılıklarının 
nedenleri arasında sektörel banka kredilerinin Gayri Safi Milli Hâsıla’ya oranının ve 
sektörlerde çalışan erkek işçi oranının önemli olduğu bulunmuştur.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kayıtdışılık, Sosyal Güvenlik, Kayıtdışılık Farklılıkları, Lineer 
Olasılık Modeli, Uygulanabilir Genelleştirilmiş En Küçük Kareler Metodu. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The term informality means different things to different people, but almost 
always with negative connotations: unprotected workers, excessive regulation, 
low efficiency and unfair competition, evasion of rule of law, underpayment or 
nonpayment of taxes and work underground or in the shadows1. Having no 
common description has given rise to usage of many terms in informality 
definition by scholars.  
Feige (1990) defines informality as follows: “…when economic agent’s 
actions fail to adhere to the established rules or are denied their protection, the 
agent is regarded as a member of the informal sector of the economy”. Assaad 
(1987) and Portes (1994) state that the important characteristic of informality is 
the noncompliance with legal and administrative regulations rather than the social 
regulations. Maloney (2004) characterizes the informal sector as consisting of 
“small-scale, semi-legal, often low-productivity, and frequently family-based, 
perhaps pre-capitalistic enterprises”.  
Schneider and Enste (2000) use the term “shadow economy” instead of 
informality and they broaden the definition as all market based legal production of 
                                               
1 See the report Informality, Exit and Exclusion by Perry et al. (2007) which was published by the 
World Bank. The report concentrates on the countries in Latin America and Caribbean. 
 2  
goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities to avoid 
payment of income or value added taxes, to avoid payment of social security 
contributions, to avoid having to meet certain legal market standards, such as 
minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc. and to avoid 
complying with certain administrative procedures such as completing statistical 
questionnaires or other administrative forms.      
The International Labor Organization (1993) describes the informal sector 
consisting of economic units “with low level of organization with little or no 
division of labor and capital as factors of production on a small scale and mostly 
based on personal and social relations rather than contractual arrangements”2. In 
our study we will focus on the “noncompliance with the legal and administrative 
regulations” view of informality and use social security non-registration of 
workers as a measure which complies with the definitions that Asaad (1997) and 
Portes (1994) use. 
Since informal activities are seen as a drag on productivity and growth of 
the economy and may lead to erosion of the functioning and the legitimacy of 
market and equity enhancing institutions, evaluation and measurement is 
important for policy implications and in turn for the well-being of the economy. 
Moreover, the social part of the incidence is also a central issue since jobs in the 
informal sector lack a sheltering mechanism to families from adverse shocks, loss 
of jobs, illness or calamity3. 
 
                                               
2 This definition belongs to the International Labor Organization (ILO) Resolutions Concerning 
Statistics of Employment in the Informal Sector Adopted by the 15th International Conference of 
Labor Statisticians in January 1993. 
3 See Perry et al. (2007). 
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This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides information about 
methods for estimating informality. In Chapter 3, the thesis will present the 
literature review about informality. Chapter 4 gives explanation about the data 
with some preliminary evidence about informality in Turkey. Moreover, I will 
also present the regression results related with workers’ characteristics and sector 
of employment in the probability of informal employment, and the methodology 
which is used for creating a new comparable measure related with the probability 
of sectors to employ people informally and compare the sectors using this new 
measure of informality. Additionally, Chapter 4 presents the possible explanations 
of the differences of sectors in terms of informal employment applying regression 
analysis using the new measures of informality of the sectors. Finally, in Chapter 
5, I will present concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
METHODS FOR ESTIMATING INFORMALITY 
 
 
 
Despite the fact that measurement of the extent of informality is a very 
crucial indicator for the well being of the economy, due to heterogeneity in terms 
of its definition and lack of data, there is no certain answer on how to do so. 
Moreover, since most economic activities that are classified as informal are not 
captured by national accounts and official statistics, the disputes on exact 
measurements of informality are likely to persist in the literature in the near 
future. 
Although the difficulty of measurement is obvious, there are several 
methods that have been enhanced in order to gauge the size of the informal 
economy. Garcia-Verdu (2007) classifies these methods into three: direct 
methods, indirect methods (indicator approaches) and the model approach4: 
Direct approaches to measure informality use voluntary surveys or data 
from tax audits to construct estimates of total economic activity and its measured 
and unmeasured components.  
                                               
4 This categorization and explanation of the methods are heavily based on the report of 
Informality, Exit and Exclusion by Perry et al. (2007). 
 5  
 These surveys usually ask respondents to pronounce their labor status, 
social security conditions or the degree of tax compliance in their industry. On the 
other hand, tax audit based approaches calculates the size of the informal 
economy using the difference between the income-stated tax returns and the exact 
level of income, which is usually found after an audit. The major problem with 
voluntary surveys is the degree of credibility of the answers. Furthermore, tax-
audit-based methods are applicable only to a few countries due to lack of data5.  
Indirect methods, which are based on macroeconomic indicators, are 
associated with the difference between the actual value of the macroeconomic 
variable and its account value. For example, one of these methods measures the 
difference between the GDP through income and expenditure sides, where the 
discrepancy is attributed to the informal economy. The main problem with the 
GDP method is that it may not give precise results in the economies with high 
saving rates and transfer payments to abroad. Another method in indirect 
measurement of informality is the electricity consumption approach. Kauffman 
and Kaliberda (1996) propose that the difference between the growth rates of 
GDP and electricity consumption can be attributed to the growth of the informal 
economy. Although this approach has been used by many authors6, it has some 
shortcomings. For example, it does not account for the technological improvement 
in machinery and in order to compute the difference one needs to have a base year 
where informal economy is insignificant. The third method is the currency 
demand approach where the main purpose is to detect the discrepancy between the 
estimated values of the specified money demand equation and the observed values 
                                               
5 Schnedier (2005) uses tax audit based approach for US and Sweden. 
6 See Ghosh and Saumik (2007) and Ihrig and Moe (2004), among others. 
 6  
from actual data7. But this method has also been criticized due to assumptions 
such as a common velocity of money circulation between official and unofficial 
economies, only cash transactions in the unofficial part of the economy or a base 
year where the extent of the unofficial economy is zero8. 
The third and last group includes the Multiple Indicator - Multiple Cause 
(MIMIC)9 models. In MIMIC models the main idea is that there is a system of 
equations where one group of equations includes the effects (or indicators) as a 
function of the latent variable (informal economy in our case) and the other group 
models the informal economy as a function of the causal variables. Applying 
maximum likelihood estimation to the reduced form of the system of equations 
which are constructed from the indicator variables and causal variables, the size of 
the informal economy is estimated. The model is a popular one among the others 
since it enables one to incorporate several different causal factors that influence 
underground activity and to determine their relative significance. Moreover, it 
allows one to take into account several different “signals” of underground 
economic activity simultaneously10. However, this approach is also subject to 
many criticisms; for example Smith (2002) and Hill (2002) state that the model 
should have relevant causal and indicator variables but there are no common 
economic theories to classify them. Moreover, Breusch (2005) shows that time 
path estimation of the informal economy for Canada during the period 1976-1994 
using this method leads to wrong results; the results mostly reflects price inflation 
and real growth rate of the related country rather than the size of the informal 
economy.  
                                               
7 See Schneider (1986). 
8 See Thomas (1999) and Schneider (1986) for criticisms of the method.  
9 A simple explanation of the theoretical model is available at Breush (2005) and Macias (2008). 
10 See Tedds and Giles (2000). 
 7  
In this study, we will use the direct approach method by utilizing the social 
security registration information of the respondents in the Labor Force Household 
Survey Yearly Dataset for the period 2000-2008 for Turkey. The information 
regarding the social security registration status of the individuals provides us 
accurate information as a measure of informality which makes our measurement 
relatively straightforward and more precise compared to the indirect methods and 
MIMIC model. We have the advantage of the truthfulness of the respondents; 
since the survey has a legal side and people might be subject to sanctions in case 
of false information. Besides, workers do not have obvious incentives to report 
that they are formal when they are informal as opposed to firms’ incentives to 
answer similar questions (since hefty penalties can be imposed on firms)11. So, 
this analysis overcomes the criticisms regarding surveys in general, where the 
respondents might not reveal the truth in their responses. As the survey is carried 
out by the legal authorities and there is a punishment for false information, these 
concerns are much less regarding this specific survey. Moreover, we have weights 
of the individuals for each year to have projections of the population which allows 
us to make more reliable inferences related with the whole population, not only 
for the sample size.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11 See Catao, Pages and Rosales (2009). They also state that using social security registration data 
for the measure of informality is highly correlated with other economy-wide the measures of 
informality.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Besides the measurement attempt, there is also a very large literature 
concentrating on the determinants of the informal economy. Below I will provide 
an overview of the literature, with a focus on the studies on informality in Turkey.   
 
3.1.   Determinants of Informality  
3.1.1.   Explicit and Implicit Taxes 
While demand for greater flexibility, autonomy and entrepreneurship 
motives, risk taking, family tradition and mobility opportunities can be counted as 
voluntarily decisions for choosing informal sector, Blau (1987) and Maloney 
(1999) state that being short of human capital particular to a work or a firm may 
force people to prefer informal works. Loayza (1997), Azuma and Grossman 
(2002) and Dabla Norris et al. (2008) suggest that since formality imposes fiscal 
burdens on a firm such as taxes or costs of complying with regulatory 
requirements (for example social security contributions), firms try to operate 
informally by taking the risk of penalties. 
 9  
In their empirical work, Friedman et al. (2000) evaluate 69 countries12 
from very different regions and find that higher tax rates are associated with less 
informal activity as a percent of GDP13. They also evaluate corruption and they 
find that it is associated with more informal activity in view of the fact that 
entrepreneurs try to avoid formal work to reduce the cost of official procedure. On 
the other hand, Schneider and Enste (2000) estimate the size of the shadow 
economy for 76 developing, transition and OECD countries and find that informal 
activity is strongly related to increasing burdens of taxation, social security 
contributions and the corruption level in the economy.  
Ihrig and Moe (2000) also investigate how tax policy affects the size of 
informal sector and tries to quantify the cost of it using a dynamic model. Sarte 
(2001) analyzes the link between the rent-seeking bureaucracies and the size of 
the informal economy in a theoretical perspective and concludes that because of 
the rent seeking bureaucrats, firms try to go informal. In their 75 country cross 
country panel data regression analysis, Loayza et al. (2005) finds that a heavier 
regulatory burden, particularly in product and labor markets induces informality. 
 
3.1.2.   Financial Development 
Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) investigates the effect of financial market 
development and the quality of regulatory burden on informality as well for more 
than 4000 firms in 41 countries and discover that both of these aspects also do 
play a role in driving informality. Straub (2005) evaluates the credit market 
channel of the informal economy in a theoretical manner. Building a model of 
                                               
12 See related paper for the list of countries. 
13 This result can be contradictory to what one expects but the authors express that the main reason 
can be that at least for this set of countries, higher tax rates may generate revenue that provides 
productivity enhancing public goods and a strong legal environment. 
 10  
firms’ choice between formality and informality, he finds that complying with 
costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods, 
enforcement of property rights and contracts that finally result in the participation 
in the formal credit market. Moreover, Koeda and Dabla-Norris (2008) affirm this 
fact and find evidence that informality is robustly and significantly associated 
with lower access to and use of bank credit for firms in 26 transition countries in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
In a recent work, using the National Household Survey Data for the  period 
2002-2007 and social registration condition of workers and formal employment 
contracts data of workers as measures of informality, Catao, Pages and Rosales 
(2009) also find that financial deepening increases the formalization rate in Brazil. 
They suggest that since formal credit saves on higher costs and legal insecurity of 
informal credit markets, firms’ incentives to become formal to get cheaper credit 
from banks increases. 
 
3.1.3.   Trade liberalization 
The trade aspect of informality is also investigated by many researchers. 
Among them, Currie and Harrison (1997), where they used micro-level data on 
individual enterprises, examine the trade reform in Morocco during the 1980s and 
find that comprehensive trade liberalization led to a rise in firms’ hiring of more 
temporary workers (who are mostly informal). Additionally Pavcnik and Goldberg 
(2003) study the relationship between trade reforms in Brazil and Colombia and 
the size of the informal sector. They test the hypothesis that increased foreign 
competition in developing countries leads to an expansion of the informal sector. 
They find that there is weak evidence, only for Colombia, and for the period 
 11  
preceding a major labor market reform that increased the flexibility of the 
Colombian labor market.  Another study by Aleman-Castilla (2006) evaluates the 
relationship between import tariff reduction under NAFTA and informality for the 
period 1988-2002 for Mexico. Using social security coverage data as an indicator 
of informality, they find that by inducing the most productive formal firms to 
engage in trade, trade liberalization could reduce the incidence of informality 
through the increase for the labor demand from the less efficient informal firms to 
more efficient formal ones, increasing the employment share of the formal 
sector14. 
 
3.2.   Informality in Turkey 
Studies on informality in Turkey have increased since the early 1990s. 
Many of these studies have focused on estimating its size. Among those, Yılmaz 
and Öğünç (2000), Çetintaş and Vergil (2003), Yurdakul (2006) and Akalın and 
Kesikoğlu (2007) use monetary approaches to estimate the informal economy in 
Turkey. Temel et al. (1994) estimate the size using the indirect methods while 
Savaşan (2003) and Schneider and Savaşan (2007) use Multiple Indicator - 
Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model. Us (2005) evaluates informality in Turkey by 
using the Tax Auditing Approach (Direct Method), the Employment Approach, 
the GNP Approach and the Monetarist Approach (Indirect Methods) and compare 
the results; concluding that it is very difficult to focus on only one method since 
calculated sizes differ across methods of measurement.   
                                               
14 This is a contradictory result compared to study of Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003), and author ties 
to the fact that liberalization of trade in Brazil and Colombia has been rather different from the 
1990s Mexican experience (See the related paper).  
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Tansel (1999) evaluates the choice of informality among the wage earners 
in terms of being covered by a social security program or not and expresses that 
both for men and women, people with more education are more likely to have 
social security coverage. Additionally, she also states that people who live in 
urban areas are more likely to have social security coverage compared to people in 
rural areas. Bulutay and Taştı (2004) analyze the informality trend in Turkey with 
respect to different definitions15 using two different datasets; Household Labor 
Force Surveys (1990-1999) and Urban Areas Small and Unincorporated 
Enterprise Survey for the year 2000 and they find that younger people and less 
educated individuals work tend to more informally16.  
Saraçoglu (2008) studies informal sector in a dynamic model and finds that 
informality can successfully be reduced by reducing taxes on employment in the 
formal sector. Another study by Schneider and Savaşan (2006) address the 
sectoral and micro aspects of informality using data from the textile sector in 
Turkey. Using a questionnaire related with the informal hiring in the textile sector 
in 2005, they find that high competition, the skill structure of the employees and 
the size of the firms are important factors of the textile firms hiring informally.  
The main findings of the studies for other countries and Turkey generally 
comply with each other. For example, Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) also confirms 
Bulutay and Taştı (2004) by finding that more educated people and elder 
individuals tend to work more formally compared to less educated people and 
single individuals for Brazil. In fact this is not a very surprising result since one 
can expect that education and skill provides more work opportunities to people 
                                               
15 See the related paper for various definitions. 
16 In their study, Bulutay and Taştı (2004) also analyze the sectoral composition (industry, trade 
and service) of formal and informal people. But this analysis is only based on the number, share 
and gender of the formal and informal workers and remains very descriptive and limited to three 
very broad sector classifications. 
 13  
compared to less educated or less skilled people. Moreover, one can also expect 
that younger people also tend to work more informally since the elder people 
consider health care opportunities for their family members compared to younger 
people.  
The positive effect of reducing the tax on employment for the formal 
employment tend to be a general pronouncement for the studies Loayza (1997), 
Azuma and Grossman (2002) and Dabla Norris et al. (2008) and Schneider and 
Enste (2002) with Saraçoğlu (2008) which makes us to consider heavy tax burden 
as a general problem for the firms, which forces them to operate informally. 
There are also several administrative reports regarding informality in 
Turkey. For example, The 8th Five Year Development Plan has a special report 
providing comprehensive information about the causes, consequences, methods 
for determining its size, including many of its perspectives like national income, 
employment, tax and illegal activities17.  
In another report, Özlale (2008) presents valuable information about the 
size, institutional and macroeconomic determinants of informality and sector-
based opinions of firms regarding informality. He emphasizes that there is an 
increasing trend in informality in the crisis years (1994 and 2001); and the weak 
regulations in tax policies, the cost of employing and social security contributions 
of the formal workers seem to be the primary problems for the firms and construct 
basis of informality in Turkey. 
 In this thesis, we will analyze informality not only at the national level but 
also at the sectoral level and examine its determinants by following the 
                                               
17 Report available at http://www.dpt.gov.tr/DocObjects/Download/3455/oik614.pdf 
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methodology of Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003)18. In doing so, we will also be able 
to discuss the personal characteristics that lead to informal employment of an 
individual. While there are ample studies on informality in Turkey, there is no 
study that looks into informality at the sector level for a wide range of sector 
definitions (Bulutay et al. (2004) study only 3 sectors and Schneider and Savaşan 
(2006) only look into the textile sector). It is of interest to further understand the 
dynamics and determinants of informality in Turkey, across sectors and across 
time (2000-2008). 
Using the Household Labor Force Survey Data for the years 2000-2008, 
we will provide current dynamics of informality in Turkey, both at the individual 
and sectoral level. This is the first study that combines these two aspects for 
Turkey and allows a synchronous discussion of the factors that play a role in an 
individual’s informal employment and those that influence the extent of 
informality at the sectoral level. From the individual worker’s point of view, I will 
investigate the role of worker’s characteristics like age, age-squared, sex, marital 
status, education level and living in urban and rural areas on an individual’s 
working informally. Upon decomposing worker’s characteristics and sectoral 
informality, we will create a new measure of relative informality levels of each 
sector and a hypothetical sector that represents “the average of all sectors” which 
is the main aim of this thesis. This will allow identification of whether there are 
sectors which are ridden by “chronic informality”19. Then using these sectoral 
informality measures, I will also try to determine the underlying reasons of the 
high levels of informality in these sectors using several variables that have 
                                               
18 This methodology allows us to decompose personal and sectoral characteristics of informality. 
Moreover, we will also be able to evaluate the determinants of the sectoral informality levels.  
19 This definition belongs to the author. By “chronic informality” author means the sectors that 
have persistent high levels (above the “average”) of informality levels for a long period (nine years 
in our data set) stemming from the reasons apart from workers’ characteristics.  
 15  
possible explanations in the differences probability of informal employment 
across sectors. Evaluating all these may guide implementation of effective policies 
on a sectoral basis to policymakers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
            In this study, the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey (HLFS) annual 
data will be used20. It covers the period 2000-2008 and it is a cross sectional 
data21. The survey is prepared on a monthly basis and the results are published 
every month. But when the data set is prepared for a specific month, for instance 
February, three monthly data sets are combined (January and March are also 
added) by taking the weights of each month into consideration. The survey is 
prepared as follows: surveyors go to the same families four times in eighteen 
months. For example, a family, which is visited on January 2000 for the first time, 
will be visited after three months (in April). The third visit will be after nine 
months (in January 2001) and the fourth visit will be in (April 2001). If the visit 
on January is the second visit to that family, then the third visit will follow after 
nine months. This means, the same people are counted twice in the same year’s 
data set. Since we do not have the data of each individual specifically, we use data 
                                               
20 Quarterly data is not publicly available. 
21 Although the data sets for 2000-2003 and 2004-2008 are different in number of questions and 
their categories, observations and regions, I standardize the categories of the variables that are used 
in the regressions. Moreover, the data set we use is weighted by taking base year as 2000. 
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set as cross-section on yearly basis (same people are counted as if they are 
different)22. 
The surveyors ask a set of questions to all members of the families 
regarding their socioeconomic characteristics. The surveys contain useful 
information about a person’s age, marital status, gender, level of education, 
employment activities, whether he/she has a social security registration, his/her 
sector of employment and several other variables.    
 This study does not take people into account who are under the age of 15 
due to the labor force definition of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). 
Our informality measure is based on the question of “Are you registered in Social 
Security?”23.  People who are registered are denoted as 0, and those who are not 
are denoted as 1.  We will regress this informality measure on socioeconomic 
factors like gender, level of education, age, marital status and dummy variables 
capturing seven main sectors we have in the data set24 using the linear probability 
model (LPM), linear probability model with weighted least squares  and the Probit 
model, respectively. Upon obtaining  the coefficients of the regressors, we will 
apply a two stage restricted method which is presented by Haisken-DeNew and 
Schmidt (1994) and used by Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) in order to find the 
main informality measure that we focus on.  
 The Linear Probability Model (LPM) method is used while regressing the 
probability of an individual being formally employed on personal characteristics 
                                               
22 For more information about the LFHS, see report Labor Force, Employment and Unemployment 
Statistics available on http://www.tuik.gov.tr/IcerikGetir.do?istab_id=134.  
23 The social security registration of the workers as a measure of informality is included in direct 
methods of calculating informality and also used by Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003), Attanasio et al. 
(2004), Aleman-Castilla (2006) and Henley et al. (2009) in their studies. 
24 One category is dropped in order to prevent multicollinearity. In fact many sectors in the data set 
are combined and this combination results in remaining nine sector categories. Among them, one 
category of combined sectors is dropped (electricity, gas and water supply) since in 2001; all 
people in this category are reported as working formally. 
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and sectoral dummies as in the work of Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003). I will also 
apply linear probability model with weighted least squares and probit regressions 
for robustness purposes due to several theoretical problems associated with the 
LPM (heteroskedasticity, and the fact that fitted, i.e. predicted probabilities may 
lie outside the range of 0 and 1).  
 We will define the regression model as follows: 
P(informal)= y = Zδ + Xβ + ε  (1) 
In the model, the dependent variable is the probability of being formal (y=0) or 
informal (y=1) (i.e. having a social security registration or not). Z includes 
variables of personal characteristics and area of residence of the individual, where 
the variables are listed as follows: 
Gender (male): This variable is assigned the value of 0 if the individual is 
female, and 1 if male. Existing literature does not have a common ground related 
with the effect of this variable on probability of formal or informal employment. 
For instance, while Maloney (2004) states that women are over-represented in the 
informal labor markets of developing countries, Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) and 
Aleman-Castilla (2006) argue that men are more likely to be employed informally 
in Colombia and Mexico.  
Age (age_groups): We have 12 age categories in the data set. The first 
category is eliminated since it includes individuals who are below the age of 15 
and are out of the labor force according to the definition of TURKSTAT. The 
second category includes people who are between the ages of 15 and 19. The 
remaining categories are constructed with 4 year intervals as in the second 
category (for example the third category consists of individuals who are between 
the ages of 25 and 29 etc.). Only the last category includes a wider range; this 
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category includes all people who are 65 years old and above.  The literature 
expresses that young people are generally employed informal25. Bulutay and Taştı 
(2004) confirm this for Turkey; they state that people in younger ages are more 
likely to be employed informally. However there are some works which express 
that the effect of age on the probability of informal employment is not very clear. 
For example, Maloney (2004) stresses that people in older ages may desire to be 
self employed after accumulating experience in formal works so that the effect of 
age on the probability of formal or informal employment can be difficult to 
evaluate.    
age_groups2: This variable is calculated by taking the square of 
age_groups variable in order to see the marginal effect of age increase, whether it 
has a decreasing or increasing contribution to the probability of working 
informally.  
Level of education (educlev): In the data set, we have 7 categories of 
education levels; illiterate, incomplete basic education, primary school, secondary 
and vocational education, general high school, vocational high school and tertiary 
education (faculty, university and masters/PhDs.). Individuals with no, or 
minimum education are mostly expected to be informal wage employees26. The 
works of Bulutay and Taştı (2004) and Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) confirm this; 
the effect of education is found to be negative in informal employment in their 
studies.   
Marital status (married): People who are married during the period of 
the survey are assigned the value of 1 and other people are assigned the value of 0. 
The effect of marital status of workers on the probability of formal or informal 
                                               
25 See Jütting et al. (2008) for more information related with the literature. 
26See report “Informal Employment Reloaded” byJütting et al. (2008)  for more detailed literature 
survey about education available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/7/39900874.pdf  
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employment is also uncertain in the literature. For example Pavcnik and Goldberg 
(2003) find that marriage is an important determinant of informal working and 
married people are more likely to be employed informally in Brazil and Colombia 
whereas Perotti and Puerta (2009) observe that married people are more likely to 
be employed formally in Bulgaria. 
Region of residence (urban): This variable stands for the area of 
residence of the individual. If the individual lives in a city, it is assigned the value 
1 and 0 otherwise (if he or she lives in the rural area). Bulutay and Taştı (2004) 
states that in urban areas educated people are more likely to be employed formally 
compared to less educated people. By adding this variable into regressions, we 
will be able to evaluate the individual effect of living area in the probability of 
informal employment.  
The X vector includes our eight sectors: agriculture, forestry, hunting and 
fishing (agr), mining and quarrying (min), manufacturing (manuf), construction 
(cons), wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods,  hotels and restaurants (whole), transportation, 
communication and storage (trans), financial intermediation, real estate, renting 
and business activities(fin) and other social, community and personal service 
activities; public administration and defense; compulsory social security, 
excluding armed forces; education; health and social work (social)27.  
 
                                               
27 From now on, we will use names agriculture sector for “agriculture, forestry and fishing”,  
“wholesale sector” for “wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods,  hotels and restaurants”, “transportation” for “transportation, 
communication and storage”, “financial sector” for “financial intermediation, real estate, renting 
and business activities” and “social sector” for “other social, community and personal service 
activities; public administration and defense; compulsory social security, excluding armed forces; 
education; health and social work”  instead of writing the whole group of sectors each time in 
order to save space. 
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4.1.    Some Preliminary Evidence 
The Table 4.1.1 presents the informal share of the workers for the related 
variables. We see that, in all years, informal share of working women in female 
employment is higher than the working men in male employment. Over the 
period, we also observe that the informality shares of both men and women 
decreases generally; but the increase in informal shares for both men and women 
in 2001 (crisis year) is remarkable. Single people also have higher shares of 
informal employment compared to married people. The people who work in urban 
areas tend to have higher shares of informal employment compare to rural areas.  
The distinction among sectors in terms of informal employment shares is 
also noteworthy.  For instance, the percentage of informally employed people in 
agriculture is higher than other sectors; approximately 90% of the people in this 
sector work informally. Construction sector also has high shares of informal 
employment; but not as much as agriculture does. The informal employment share 
in this sector tends to be stable; roughly 60% during the period. Wholesale and 
transportation sectors have relatively low shares of informal employment 
compared to agriculture and construction; but their level is higher than that in 
manufacturing, finance, social sector and mining. The informal employment 
shares of financial sector and social sector are similar to each other and follow 
similar patterns. Mining sector has the lowest share of informal employment share 
among all sectors, and this share does not exceed 16% over the whole period.  
Informal employment share decreases as with more education. For 
example, the informal employment share of illiterate people is generally higher 
than 90% during the period and this share is below 10% for the people with 
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tertiary education. It means that while 9 of 10 illiterate people are employed 
informally, only 1 of 10 people with high education is employed informally.  
The informal employment shares with respect to age groups are also 
essential to evaluate; since one cannot say that “as age increases, informal share of 
workers decreases or increases”. The table shows us that informal employment 
shares decrease as people get older but until up to the ages of 30-34; then it starts 
to increase. The lowest informal employment share belongs to people who are 
between 30 and 35.  The people, who are between 15 and 19 and above 65, have 
similar levels of informal employment shares between 2000 and 2006.  
 
Table 4.1.1. Informal employment share of the variables28 (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
28 For example, in 2000 the value of the male variable is 45. This means that 45% of male workers 
are working informally.  
Group Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
male  45 46 45 45 47 44 43 40 38 
female 70 74 73 72 71 68 66 61 59 
married  48 50 49 49 50 48 47 44 43 
not married 61 63 63 61 62 58 55 49 45 
urban 74 76 73 74 74 69 68 69 68 
w
or
ke
r 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
rural 29 32 34 33 36 36 35 34 31 
agr 89 92 90 91 90 88 87 88 88 
min 9 8 12 15 14 13 16 15 13 
manuf 27 28 32 31 31 32 32 30 26 
cons 66 62 62 64 66 64 62 60 56 
whole 38 40 43 42 44 44 43 42 40 
trans 31 33 34 34 39 39 40 38 36 
fin 14 16 19 20 21 21 20 18 16 w
or
ki
ng
 s
ec
to
r 
social 11 12 14 14 17 18 18 18 17 
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Table 4.1.1. Informal employment share of the variables (%)(cont’d) 
 Source: LFHS 
In the following section, we will be concentrating on workers’ 
characteristics and sector of employment in terms of probability of working 
formal or informal using LPM and Probit29 in order to see the individual effects of 
the related variables. 
 
4.2.   Effects of Worker’s Characteristics and Working Sectors on 
Being Formal or Informal using LPM and Probit Regression 
 
In this section we want to evaluate workers’ characteristics and the sector 
of employment on the probability of being informal. Using the LPM and Probit 
                                               
29 I have also used LPM with Weighted Least Squares for robustness purposes. Results suggest 
that some of the values of coefficients in some years have opposite signs compare to LPM and 
probit (for example urban coefficient in 2000 and 2005 has a positive sign; meaning that people 
who live in urban areas are more likely to be employed informally, which is an unexpected result 
compare to LPM and Probit). This sharp distinction probably stems from the adjustments method 
(WLS) because adjustment method may result in some problems like substantial increases in the 
magnitude of most coefficients as well as increases the usual measure of R2 (see Debertin, 
Pagoulatos and Smith (1980) for more information). For this reason, I prefer to use the coefficients 
that are derived from LPM in the rest of thesis rather than LPM with WLS (Probit regression 
results are very similar to each other as in the study of Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003)).  
illiterate 89 94 94 95 94 94 95 95 94 
incomplete basic 
education 84 85 84 88 87 86 86 87 86 
primary school 61 63 64 65 64 61 60 56 55 
secondary and 
vocational education 40 42 45 47 50 51 50 49 48 
general high school 25 27 28 29 32 31 32 30 28 
voc. high school 22 24 24 25 27 27 25 24 22 e
du
ca
tio
n 
le
ve
l 
tertiary education 5 7 8 8 9 10 9 10 9 
15-19 79 84 86 86 86 84 82 79 76 
20-24 57 62 62 60 63 57 54 48 44 
25-29 43 46 45 43 45 41 40 34 31 
30-34 40 40 40 40 43 39 37 33 31 
35-39 40 41 40 41 42 40 38 35 34 
40-44 38 39 39 40 43 41 40 36 35 
45-49 46 48 48 49 49 48 47 47 45 
50-54 56 62 61 60 61 60 61 60 60 
55-59 66 68 71 74 71 72 73 74 73 
60-64 70 77 77 83 80 80 81 84 84 
ag
e 
65 and above 81 86 83 88 85 85 85 89 90 
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Regressions30, we get the summary statistics presented in the Table 4.2.1.1 below 
for the period 2000-2008. In the regressions, we use weight factors for population 
projections provided in the data set for every year which provides us more precise 
interpretations about the whole labor force in Turkey. 
The results (with respect to LPM regressions) are as follows: 
 
4.2.1.   Worker’s Characteristics: 
male: From regression results, we see that male workers are more likely to 
work in the formal sector compared to female workers in all of the years. This can 
be attributed to the dominant role of men in the family for the responsibility of the 
household. That is, the male worker has to provide basic needs of all members of 
the family; he has to work, provide health care services etc. In this manner, one 
can expect that the male worker is likely to choose the job which provides social 
security registration among the alternatives. Moreover, the male worker can have 
more opportunities to choose among the alternatives compared to female worker, 
since some of the jobs are predominantly male oriented. For example, the male 
worker can work in mining or in construction sector, but the female worker is less 
likely to work in these kinds of jobs.  Additionally, informal employment can be 
more preferable by women since they provide flexibility to be involved in family 
responsibilities. The regression results related to male variable are contradictory 
with the results of Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) and Aleman-Castilla (2006), who 
find that men are more likely to be employed informally in Colombia and Mexico; 
but comply with the assessment of Maloney (2004).  
                                               
30 Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) use linear probability model in their regressions. Although they 
check their results with probit regressions, they continue to use linear probability model stating 
that the results are very similar to each other.  
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age_groups: Elder people tend to work formally more compared to younger 
people and this feature is more apparent especially after 2005. This result supports 
the findings of Bulutay and Taştı (2004). Increase in age groups has a decreasing 
level of contribution to formal employment. The regression result related with age 
variable may be attributed to the fact that the first aim of people in younger ages is 
to find a job. But as they get older, they probably prefer to or look for the jobs that 
provide social security due to the concerns of family and retirement.  
 educlev: Education level of people also seems to be an important factor for 
working formally. The regression results in the Table 4.2.1.1 shows us that higher 
educated people tend to work more formally in both regression models and for all 
years generally31. This result complies with the findings of Bulutay and Taştı 
(2004) for Turkey, Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) for Brazil and Colombia and 
Aleman-Castilla (2006) for Mexico. It is highly possible that education provides 
more skills and more opportunities to people and they have more choices of jobs 
compared to people who are less educated. Moreover, one can also think that 
higher educated people have more qualifications compared to less educated and 
less skilled people so that employers may tend to provide formal jobs to those 
people in order to prevent their leave. For example, it is more likely that an 
engineer is employed formally compared to a manual worker if they both work in 
the construction sector.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
31 It is also true for LPM with WLS except that year 2000, where the coefficient is negative. 
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Table 4.2.1.1. Effects of Worker’s Characteristics and Working Sector on 
Probability of Being Informal 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
*** indicates the explanatory variable is significant at 1% significance level. ** indicates the explanatory variable is 
significant at 5% significance level. R2 stands for the coefficient of determination of LPM and LPM with WLS. Pseudo-R2 
stands for the coefficient of determination in probit regression. Dependent variable is “social security coverage”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
32 Since we have used population weights for the sample, number of observations for each year 
tends to become as in the parentheses.  
LPM Probit  Variable 
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
constant 
 
0.834*** 
(0.0006) 
0.860*** 
(0.0007) 
0.994*** 
(0.0007) 
1.470*** 
(0.0025) 
1.880*** 
(0.0030) 
2.200*** 
(0.0029) 
male 
 
-0.086*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.083*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.101*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.425*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.504*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.537*** 
(0.0009) 
age_groups 
 
-0.087*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.099*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.118*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.324*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.429*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.476*** 
(0.0008) 
age_groups2 
 
0.005*** 
(0.0000) 
0.006*** 
(0.0000) 
0.007*** 
(0.0000) 
0.019*** 
(0.0001) 
0.025*** 
(0.0001) 
0.030*** 
(0.0001) 
educlev 
 
-0.068*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.068*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.073*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.286*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.303*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.299*** 
(0.0003) 
married 
 
-0.058*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.051*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.057*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.235*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.206*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.220*** 
(0.0010) 
urban 
 
-0.046*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.014*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.138*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.010*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.045*** 
(0.0009) 
agr 
 
0.550*** 
(0.0003) 
0.593*** 
(0.0003) 
0.530*** 
(0.0003) 
1.892*** 
(0.0014) 
2.123*** 
(0.0014) 
1.857*** 
(0.0014) 
min 
 
-0.056*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.058*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.040*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.147*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.259*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.106*** 
(0.0052) 
manuf 
 
0.040*** 
(0.0003) 
0.040*** 
(0.0003) 
0.052*** 
(0.0003) 
0.265*** 
(0.0013) 
0.244*** 
(0.0013) 
0.259*** 
(0.0012) 
cons 
 
0.440*** 
(0.0004) 
0.410*** 
(0.0004) 
0.400*** 
(0.0004) 
1.479*** 
(0.0016) 
1.393*** 
(0.0017) 
1.343*** 
(0.0017) 
whole 
 
0.170*** 
(0.0003) 
0.180*** 
(0.0003) 
0.190*** 
(0.0003) 
0.721*** 
(0.0013) 
0.743*** 
(0.0013) 
0.741*** 
(0.0012) 
trans 
 
0.142*** 
(0.0004) 
0.156*** 
(0.0004) 
0.149*** 
(0.0004) 
0.685*** 
(0.0017) 
0.736*** 
(0.0017) 
0.685*** 
(0.0017) 
fin 
 
0.030*** 
(0.0005) 
0.037*** 
(0.0005) 
0.040*** 
(0.0005) 
0.234*** 
(0.0023) 
0.283*** 
(0.0022) 
0.273*** 
(0.0021) 
Number of 
Observations32 
 
84.038 
(21.489.440) 
 
85.318 
(21.429.291) 
 
85.078 
(21.250.491) 
 
84.038 
(21.489.440) 
 
      85.318 
(21.429.292) 
85.078 
(21.250.492) 
 
  R
2 and 
Pseudo-R
2
 
0.450 0.477 0.435 0.385 0.426 0.386 
 27  
Table 4.2.1.1. (cont’d) 
 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
*** indicates the explanatory variable is significant at 1% significance level. ** indicates the explanatory variable is 
significant at 5% significance level.  R2 stands for the coefficient of determination in LPM. Pseudo-R2 stands for the 
coefficient of determination in probit regression. Dependent variable is “social security coverage”.  
  
married: The probability that married people work informally is lower compared 
to single people for all years. The reason for this fact can be that married people 
have more chance to search and choose formal jobs (especially if their husbands 
or wives are working). They may also prefer to search more among the jobs and 
work formally since the responsibilities of married people in their families are 
higher compared to single people. They have to provide social security not only 
                                               
33 Since we have used population weights for the sample, number of observations for each year 
tends to become as in the parentheses.  
 LPM Probit 
Variable 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
constant 
 
0.991*** 
(0.0006) 
1.000*** 
(0.0006) 
1.369*** 
(0.0010) 
2.296*** 
(0.0027) 
2.178*** 
(0.0026) 
3.421*** 
(0.0040) 
male 
 
-0.088*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.092*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.106*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.491*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.464*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.491*** 
(0.0008) 
age_groups 
 
-0.124*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.111*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.163*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.537*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.447*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.630*** 
(0.0010) 
age_groups2 
 
0.008*** 
(0.0000) 
0.007*** 
(0.0000) 
0.008*** 
(0.0000) 
0.036*** 
(0.0001) 
0.029*** 
(0.0001) 
0.034*** 
(0.0001) 
educlev 
 
-0.075*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.077*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.080*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.308*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.304*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.301*** 
(0.0002) 
married 
 
-0.060*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.070*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.069*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.225*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.265*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.246*** 
(0.0010) 
urban 
 
-0.008*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.030*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.041*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.034*** 
(0.0008) 
agr 
 
0.545*** 
(0.0003) 
0.510*** 
  (0.0003) 
0.469*** 
(0.0003) 
1.912*** 
(0.0014) 
1.736*** 
(0.0013) 
1.580*** 
(0.0013) 
min 
 
-0.049*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.079*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.118*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.042*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.175*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.341*** 
(0.0049) 
manuf 
 
0.044*** 
(0.0003) 
0.023*** 
(0.0003) 
0.017*** 
(0.0003) 
0.242*** 
(0.0012) 
0.139*** 
(0.0012) 
0.138*** 
(0.0011) 
cons 
 
0.410*** 
(0.0004) 
0.393*** 
(0.0004) 
0.365*** 
(0.0004) 
1.371*** 
(0.0017) 
1.257*** 
(0.0016) 
1.180*** 
(0.0015) 
whole 
 
0.181*** 
(0.0003) 
0.178*** 
(0.0003) 
0.158*** 
(0.0003) 
0.718*** 
(0.0012) 
0.653*** 
(0.0011) 
0.593*** 
(0.0011) 
trans 
 
0.145*** 
(0.0004) 
0.157*** 
(0.0004) 
0.151*** 
(0.0004) 
0.672*** 
(0.0017) 
0.638*** 
(0.0016) 
0.615*** 
(0.0015) 
fin 
 
0.055*** 
(0.0005) 
0.032*** 
(0.0005) 
0.025*** 
(0.0005) 
0.361*** 
(0.0020) 
0.227*** 
(0.0019) 
0.206*** 
(0.0018) 
Number of 
Observations33 
 
80.780 
(21.047.648) 
 
136.300 
(21.707.579) 
 
140.457 
(21.966.068) 
 
80.780 
(21.047.649) 
136.300 
(21.707.579) 
140.457 
(21.966.068) 
  R
2 
Pseudo-R
2
 
0.445 
 
0.410 
 
0.378 
 
0.397 0.360 0.329 
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for themselves but also for their spouses and for their children (if they have). This 
result complies with the findings of Aleman-Castilla (2006) for Mexico. 
Table 4.2.1.1. (cont’d) 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** indicates the explanatory variable is significant at 1% significance level. ** indicates 
the explanatory variable is significant at 5% significance level. R2 stands for the coefficient of determination of LPM. 
Pseudo-R2 stands for the coefficient of determination of probit regression. Dependent variable is “social security coverage”.  
 
urban: The results of the regressions also suggest that people who live in 
urban areas are more likely to have social security coverage compared to people 
who live in rural areas35.  This can be related to the variety of work opportunities 
in the urban areas compared to rural areas, holding all other things constant. 
                                               
34 Since we have used population weights for the sample, number of observations for each year 
tends to become as in the parentheses.  
35 LPM with WLS regression results show us that in 2001, 2005 and 2006, the coefficient of the 
urban dummy turns out to be positive, which is an unexpected result, as in the case of education 
level variable for 2000. 
 LPM Probit  
Variable 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
constant 
 
1.132*** 
(0.0007) 
1.150*** 
(0.0008) 
1.100*** 
(0.0008) 
2.447*** 
(0.0025) 
2.565*** 
(0.0030) 
2.486*** 
(0.0029) 
male 
 
-0.111*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.099*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.100*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.498*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.451*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.459*** 
(0.0008) 
age_groups 
 
-0.142*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.153*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.145*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.538*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.611*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.597*** 
(0.0008) 
age_groups2 
 
0.010*** 
(0.0000) 
0.011*** 
(0.0000) 
0.011*** 
(0.0000) 
0.038*** 
(0.0001) 
0.047*** 
(0.0001) 
0.047*** 
(0.0001) 
educlev 
 
-0.083*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.079*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.076*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.308*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.294*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.290*** 
(0.0002) 
married 
 
-0.057*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.045*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.037*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.203*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.158*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.137*** 
(0.0010) 
urban 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.032*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.038*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.063*** 
(0.0008) 
0.109*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.132*** 
(0.0009) 
agr 
 
0.435*** 
(0.0003) 
0.422*** 
(0.0004) 
0.425*** 
(0.0003) 
1.468*** 
(0.0007) 
1.430*** 
(0.0013) 
1.420*** 
(0.0013) 
min 
 
-0.095*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.110*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.108*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.250*** 
(0.0046) 
-0.288*** 
(0.0046) 
-0.306*** 
(0.0050) 
manuf 
 
0.012*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.0003) 
0.124*** 
(0.0011) 
0.095*** 
(0.0011) 
0.026*** 
(0.0012) 
cons 
 
0.333*** 
  (0.0004) 
0.320*** 
(0.0004) 
0.287*** 
(0.0004) 
1.080*** 
(0.0015) 
1.034*** 
(0.0015) 
0.947*** 
(0.0015) 
whole 
 
0.144*** 
(0.0003) 
0.136*** 
(0.0003) 
0.130*** 
(0.0003) 
0.548*** 
(0.0011) 
0.526*** 
(0.0011) 
0.508*** 
(0.0011) 
trans 
 
0.156*** 
(0.0004) 
0.137*** 
(0.0004) 
0.126*** 
(0.0004) 
0.622*** 
(0.0015) 
0.563*** 
(0.0015) 
0.531*** 
(0.0016) 
fin 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0138*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.028*** 
(0.0004) 
0.095*** 
(0.0017) 
0.064*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.005** 
(0.0017) 
Number of Observations34 
 
142.800 
(22.236.997) 
 
137.762 
(20.639.881) 
 
139.168 
(21.102.287) 
 
142.800 
(22.236.998) 
 
137.762 
(20.639.881) 
 
139.168 
(21.102.287) 
 
R
2 
Pseudo-R
2
 
0.368 
 
0.364 
 
0.392 
 
0.320 
 
0.323 
 
0.330 
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Moreover, compositions of the working sectors may differ in urban and rural 
areas. For example, in rural areas numbers of farmyards are much higher than the 
urban areas so that it is more likely to have agriculture as the dominant sector 
compared to an urban area. Besides, one can also think that government controls 
and labor laws are more likely to be enforced by legal authorities in urban areas 
than rural areas which can increase the probability of formal employment in urban 
areas.  
 
4.2.2.   Sector of Employment: 
Table 4.2.1.1 also shows us that the individual’s sector of employment 
plays a statistically significant role in influencing the probability of being formal 
or informal compared to the base sector (social sector)36. The social sector, which 
includes public administration and defense; compulsory social security, excluding 
armed forces; education; health and social work and other social, community and 
personal service activities is chosen as the base sector of employment and the 
following interpretation for each sector is in relation to this base sector.  
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing (agr): When we look at the 
magnitude of the coefficient “agr” from LPM regression we see that it ranges 
from 0.442 (in 2007) to 0.593 (2001). This suggests that people working in this 
sector are more likely to be employed informally compared to those in the social 
sector in all years. Although there are no empirical details that would allow 
                                               
36 The main reason for choosing social sector is the size of government role which helps us to 
differentiate the social sector from the compared sector. Moreover, in order to have reliable t-
statistics in the regressions, one should have a base year with large number of observations (social 
sector employs approximately 17% of the workers) which makes less willing to choose mining, 
construction, transportation and finance as base sector (their shares in employment are less than 
7% in all years). Apart from the fact that all sectors are statistically different from the base sector 
at 5% significance, joint significance tests of the sector dummies indicate that sectors are jointly 
significant in the probability of informal working for all models and for all years. 
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interpretation of this finding, it is a known fact that people who are working in the 
agricultural sector, especially in rural areas, most of the time do so on their own or 
family land/ business or work as unpaid family workers on these plots. As such 
they are not always governed by legal regulations (i.e. social security registration 
payments) making it more probable that a person is employed informally in the 
agriculture compared to a person (with the same observable characteristics) in the 
social sector. 
Manufacturing (manuf): The regression results show that people who 
work in the manufacturing sector are expected to be employed more informally 
compared to the base sector. One of the possible reasons may be that when we 
look at the composition of the sectors of the social sector is more likely to be 
controlled and regulated by the government (especially the sectors of public 
administration, health and education) compared to the manufacturing sector. The 
high level of government role and intervention are capable to create a positive 
effect for a sector to employ formal people compared to a less intervened one.  
Mining (min): The results for most of the years suggest that the 
probability of an individual working in the mining sector to be employed formally 
is higher compared to those people working in the social sector37. This result can 
be attributed to the share of government in mining sector. Although we do not 
have detailed information about the share of the government in mining sector for 
the evaluated period, Uzunoğlu (2005) states that government operates in 85 of 
the sector which provides us an insight related with the difference in probabilities 
of informal employment between sectors.   
                                               
37 Although the LPM and Probit regressions suggest that this finding is valid throughout the 
dataset, LPM with WLS does not confirm this conclusion; in 2000, 2003 and 2008, social sector 
becomes more formal compare to mining sector. 
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Construction (cons): The probability of being informal in this sector is 
also statistically different than that of the social sector and an individual working 
in the construction sector is more likely to be informally employed compared to 
those working in the social sector. For example, an average person can work as 
manual worker in case of losing his job since it does not necessitate high 
qualifications, which make construction sector a good alternative to work. 
Wholesale (whole): The regression results show that people who work in 
the wholesale sector are more likely to be employed more informally compared to 
the base sector. When one looks at the composition of the wholesale sector, it can 
be seen that most of the sectors can be thought as the ones with high turnover rates 
(for example wholesale, retail trade, hotels and restaurants). So, one of the 
possible explanation of the difference between the base sector and wholesale 
sector is that employers may not be very eager to employ people formally for jobs 
that have high turnovers.  
Transportation (trans): Results suggest that the probability of an 
individual working in the transportation sector being informal is higher than for 
those working in the base sector. Although there are no investigational details to 
permit understanding of the finding, one possibility is that transportation may 
have higher rates of turnover compared to social sector. Moreover, difference of 
the share of government between sectors may cause the difference in probability 
of formal employment. 
Finance (fin): For the period 2000-2005, regression results show that 
financial sector is more informal compared to social sector38. However, for the 
remaining period (2006-2008), LPM results show that this sector becomes more 
                                               
38 It is similar for LPM with WLS models in other years as well, but coefficient of financial sector 
in probit regression also changes in 2008 and this sector becomes more formal compare to social 
sector in this year. 
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informal compared to social sector. All these complicated structure of the 
financial sector can be a sign for a (dominant) structural change in the financial 
sector compare to social sector for the evaluated period.  
Although LPM is weak in providing efficient estimates theoretically, the 
results of both LPM with WLS and Probit regressions generally support the results 
from LPM regressions. These similar results give us insight to support the 
preference of LPM of Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003). However, I also find the 
related marginal probabilities from probit model in order to have a general idea of 
the marginal effects of the regressions. The results of probit regression and 
marginal probabilities are presented in the Table 4.2.2.1. 
The marginal effects from probit regression are very similar to the LPM 
model, both for workers’ characteristics and the working sectors in all years 
except for the financial sector. That is, the coefficient of this sector in 2006, 2007 
and 2008 are negative in LPM, it is negative only in year 2008 in probit 
regression.  
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Table 4.2.2.1. Marginal Probabilities39: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2.2.1. Marginal Probabilities (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
39 Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** indicates the explanatory variable 
is significant at 1% significance. Dependent variable is “social security 
coverage”.  
 
Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
male 
-0.1085*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1228*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1352*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1224*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1167*** 
(0.0002) 
age_groups 
-0.0796*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1008*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1162*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1301*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1102*** 
(0.0002) 
age_groups2 
0.0046*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0060*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0072*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0086*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0000) 
educlev 
-0.0708*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0714*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0731*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0747*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0751*** 
(0.0001) 
married 
-0.0594*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0494*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0544*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0551*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0663*** 
(0.0002) 
urban 
-0.0351*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0025*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0111*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0075*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0103*** 
(0.0002) 
agr 
0.5445*** 
(0.0003) 
0.5752*** 
(0.0003) 
0.5160*** 
(0.0003) 
0.5248*** 
(0.0003) 
0.4899*** 
(0.0003) 
min 
-0.0390*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0632*** 
0.0015) 
-0.0297*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0141*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0464*** 
(0.0012) 
manuf 
0.0618*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0532*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0589*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0545*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0308*** 
(0.0003) 
cons 
0.3706*** 
(0.0003) 
0.3290*** 
(0.0003) 
0.3174*** 
(0.0003) 
0.3266*** 
(0.0003) 
0.2928*** 
(0.0003) 
whole 
0.1709*** 
(0.0003) 
0.1681*** 
(0.0003) 
0.1729*** 
(0.0003) 
0.1676*** 
(0.0003) 
0.1529*** 
(0.0003) 
trans 
0.1681*** 
(0.0004) 
0.1708*** 
(0.0004) 
0.1624*** 
(0.0004) 
0.1595*** 
(0.0004) 
0.1510*** 
(0.0004) 
fin 
0.0554*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0638*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0633*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0846*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0528*** 
(0.0005) 
Variable 2005 2006 2007 2008 
male 
-0.1291*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1323*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1191*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1194*** 
(0.0002) 
age_groups 
-0.1620*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1400*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1582*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1511*** 
(0.0002) 
age_groups2 
0.0087*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0099*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0122*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0119*** 
(0.0000) 
educlev 
-0.0777*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0804*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0761*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0737*** 
(0.0001) 
married 
-0.0642*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0531*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0412*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0352*** 
(0.0002) 
urban 
-0.0091*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0168*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0282*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0335*** 
(0.0002) 
agr 
0.4553*** 
(0.0003) 
0.4269*** 
(0.0003) 
0.4179*** 
(0.0004) 
0.4190*** 
(0.0004) 
min 
-0.0897*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0679*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0772*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0788*** 
(0.0012) 
manuf 
0.0321*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0288*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0204*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0031*** 
(0.0003) 
cons 
0.2892*** 
(0.0003) 
0.2710*** 
(0.0003) 
0.2640*** 
(0.0004) 
0.2426*** 
(0.0004) 
whole 
0.1456*** 
(0.0003) 
0.1365*** 
(0.0003) 
0.1305*** 
(0.0003) 
0.1248*** 
(0.0003) 
trans 
0.1525*** 
(0.0004) 
0.1564*** 
(0.0004) 
0.1419*** 
(0.0004) 
0.1329*** 
(0.0004) 
fin 
0.0499*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0216*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0125*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0047*** 
(0.0004) 
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The above results only allow for interpretations about each sector relative 
to the base sector. That is, the coefficients of the sectors from regression tables 
only show us whether there is a statistical significance between the sector 
evaluated and the base sector in probability of informal employment. The 
difficulty of comparisons across all sectors stems from the fact that regressions do 
not tell us much about the overall evolution of the absolute informality in a 
specific sector or in the overall economy.  The following section will deal with 
this issue by providing a “well-defined average40” probability measure for each 
sector which will allow investigation of the sectoral differences in a clearer way.   
 
4.3.   Renormalization of Informality Differentials41 
Our estimation model in more explicit terms is: 
Yijt = Zijt*δit + Xijt*βjt + εijt  (1) 
Here, Yijt stands for a worker i in sector j in year t. This value is 1 if the worker 
works informally. δit represents the coefficient vector of worker characteristics Z, 
and βjt represents the specific coefficients of sector indicators X, indicating the 
workers’ sector affiliation. 
The coefficient on the sector dummy βjt captures the part of variation in 
informal employment that cannot be explained by worker characteristics, but can 
be explained by the worker’s sector affiliation. These coefficients are labeled as 
“informality differentials”. These coefficients are obtained from the first stage 
                                               
40 See Suits (1984) and Kennedy (1986).  They suggest finding the coefficients by using an 
appropriate procedure and then express those coefficients as deviations from a “well defined 
average”. In this way, they are also able to include the base category so that the interpretation of 
the model is more convenient. In this manner, many authors, for example Krueger and Summers 
(1988), Haisken DeNew and Schmidt (1997), Pavcnik and Goldberg (2005) in labor economics, 
uses an employment share weighted mean for this “well defined average”. We will follow an 
approach similar to Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003). 
41 This part of the thesis heavily depends on Haisken De-New and Schmidt (1997). 
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regressions, estimated with the LPM. These coefficients do not provide 
information on the overall level of informality and its absolute evolution over time 
in a sector, but rather shows whether a sector is statistically different from the 
base sector in explaining the variation in the probability of informal employment. 
So, the need for normalization of the estimated coefficients which will allow 
comparison across sectors and time is evident, it is important since the 
interpretation of the coefficients may sometimes be problematic especially when 
one uses dummy variables as independent variables as in our case.  
In this manner, I will follow the method of Krueger and Summers (1988), 
who use a normalization technique to explicitly express industry differentials as 
deviations from a hypothetical employment share mean (a well-defined average). 
These normalized coefficients are measured using the coefficients from the first 
stage estimation, Equation (1). The method is as follows:    
Suppose that one has a regression model as above: 
y = Zδ + Xβ + ε    (1) 
where y is an (n x 1) vector of the dependent variable, Z is an (n x g) matrix of 
regressors (in our model it will be our set of worker’s characteristics such as 
education, gender, age…), X is an (n x (k+1)) containing a constant term as its 
first element and k indicators for groups (sector dummies in our case). δ and β are 
(g x 1) and ((k+1) x 1) vectors of parameters, respectively, and ε is an (nx1) 
vector of random errors42. In the estimation procedure, one has to put a restriction 
on the vector X to avoid multicollinearity.  
 In order to express the individual sector coefficients as deviations from a 
well defined average, the stages of the method are as follows: 
                                               
42 This paragraph is directly from Haisken DeNew and Schmidt (1997). 
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First one solves the restrictions out of the model by dropping one of the 
group indicators from the regression, say the kth indicator. Then perform the 
regression43 to receive the estimated coefficient vectors for δ and β, d (coefficients 
of Z) and b (coefficients of X) respectively. Here b= (b0, b1,…,bk-1, 0)’ where b0  
stands for the constant term and 0 is for the base sector dummy.                  
In the second step, one normalizes the coefficients b which is obtained 
from the first stage estimation. The normalization is obtained by forming linear 
combinations as follows: 
 b* = Ib - Wb,      (2) 
where I is (k+1) x(k+1) identity matrix and W=(w,w,…,w)’  is a matrix formed by 
the weights of the sectors in each row, where w=(0, w1, w2,…,wk) stands for the 
employment shares of the related sectors and wi’=1 for i= (1,1,…,1)44.  Then it 
follows that 
 b*= [I-W]b     (3) 
If we write a normalized coefficient for a specific sector j, we will have that 
            bj*= bj –Σwjbj              for j=0,…,k.  (4)          
where Σwjbj is the total sum of the coefficients (informality differentials) 
multiplied by corresponding sector employment shares. This allows us to express 
the coefficients bj*s as the deviations of the estimated coefficients from a 
weighted mean.  
                                               
43 In the original paper Haisken DeNew and Schmidt (1997) uses ordinary least square since they 
want to compare their regression results and the standard errors of the normalized differentials 
with the Krueger and Summers (1988) who use log wages (a continues variable) as the dependent 
variable in regressions. Nevertheless, Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003), who apply this method to 
discrete variable case (they use being formal or informal as dependent variable) also create related 
normalized informality differentials after probit regression. 
44 Using this procedure, we will create a hypothetical sector that represents average of all 
industries through employment shares. The value of this sector will also be normalized to zero and 
the interpretations related with coefficients will be based on the deviations from this zero value of 
average sector. 
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Note also that wb*=0 provides  the average hypothetical sector. Moreover, 
the relevant part of the variance-covariance matrix of b* can be calculated as: 
 V(b*)=[I-W]V(b)[I-W]’   (5) 
where  
. 
Following this methodology, one can also create “a new measure” of 
average sectoral differences in Turkey. The sum of the employment share 
weighted probabilities of being informal (wb) for each sector should provide us an 
indicator for this measure45. This new measure is labeled as the “employment 
weighted average informality differential46”. The trend of this measure reported in 
Figure 4.3.1 for the whole period, where each line represents a different 
estimation method, the LPM and Probit. The detailed results of LPM and Probit 
were discussed in the previous section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
45 The level of this new measure changes according to the choice of base sector; but trend of the 
new measure is similar even for different base categories.  
46 This definition belongs to Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003). 
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Figure 4.3.1. Employment Weighted Average Informality Differentials for 
LPM and Probit Regressions 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
LPM 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16
Probit 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 
From the figure, we see that the differences of sectors in terms of 
probability of informal employment decreases during 2000-2008 and this is true 
for both groups of normalized differentials from LPM and Probit regressions.  
Additionally, LPM and Probit has nearly same levels of average of probability 
differences and trends for all years. 
Following the methodology, the normalized coefficients, which express 
the deviations from the employment-weighted average informality differentials47, 
and their figures, are presented in Table 4.3.1, Figure 4.3.2 and Figure 4.3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
47 I also calculated the weighted average informality differentials by using the sectoral GDP over 
total GDP as weight. The relative differences of the sectors did not change. Only wholesale and 
transportation sectors were closer to the average sector but they tended to be informal with these 
new weights. 
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Table 4.3.1. Normalized Informality Differentials for LPM and Probit48: 
 LPM Probit 
Sector 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
agr 0.33 0.36 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.30 
min -0.27 -0.30 -0.27 -0.26 -0.29 -0.25 
manuf -0.18 -0.20 -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 -0.16 
cons 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.10 
whole -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 
trans -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 
fin -0.19 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 
social -0.22 -0.24 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 -0.22 
 LPM Probit 
Sector 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
agr 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.26 
min -0.29 -0.31 -0.32 -0.23 -0.26 -0.29 
manuf -0.17 -0.21 -0.18 -0.16 -0.18 -0.16 
cons 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.09 
whole -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 
trans -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 
fin -0.15 -0.20 -0.18 -0.13 -0.16 -0.15 
social -0.20 -0.23 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22 -0.20 
 LPM Probit 
Sector 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
agr 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.26 
min -0.28 -0.28 -0.27 -0.25 -0.24 -0.24 
manuf -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
cons 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.08 
whole -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
trans -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
fin -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 
social -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 
  
Since the normalized informality differentials are as deviations from the 
employment weighted mean informality differential, these normalized informality 
differentials can be interpreted as “the percentage point difference in probability 
of informal employment for a worker in a given sector relative to an average 
                                               
48 Although not reported, in both models, the normalized differentials are significant at 5% 
significance. Zanchi (1998) state that t-tests concerning the normalized differentials have a more 
straightforward and meaningful interpretation in terms of sector informality differentials. While t-
tests for the industry parameters in model (1) test whether the probability of being informal for 
employees in each of the sectors are significantly different from the probability of being informal 
in base sector, t-tests for the sector coefficients in Table 4.3.1. can be used to test whether the 
probability of being informal in each of the total 8 sectors are significantly different from the 
probability of being informal for the average employee in the economy. See Zanchi (1998) for the 
interpretation of the normalized coefficients.  
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worker in all industries with the same observable characteristics”49. This 
interpretation is advantageous to the interpretation of the coefficients in the LPM 
and Probit model in terms of comparison. Using this methodology, one can make 
interpretations related with differences of probabilities of each sector in terms of 
formal or informal employment in the regression, even related with the base 
sector. It is possible because the methodology provides the inclusion of the base 
sector with a comparable informality level.  
From Table 4.3.1 and related figures, we see that the LPM and Probit 
model results are very similar to each other. Moreover, as we can see from the 
figures clearer, some sectors have a sharp difference in terms probability of 
informal employment in all of the three models, where we can define as sectors 
with “chronic informality”.  
 
Figure 4.3.2.  Normalized Informality 
Differentials with LPM*: 
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Figure 4.3.3. Normalized Informality    
Differentials with Probit**: 
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We observe that in agriculture and construction, people are more likely to 
be employed informally compared to all sectors in all years. Mining and social 
                                               
49 This interpretation belongs to Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) 
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sectors tend to be the most formal sectors; although in probit model the level of 
informality difference of the social sector decreases and became very similar to 
financial and manufacturing sector. Wholesale and transportation sectors are the 
most likely sectors to represent the average of the all sectors.  
The mining sector, which should be evaluated specially due to the 
dominant share of government, is the most formal among all the sectors. By “most 
formal” it is meant that the relative probability of this sector to employ people 
formally on average is higher compare to all sectors. For example, if a person 
works in the average sector (whose value is 0) and changes his or her job; the 
probability that he or she will be employed formally will be increased by 32 
percentage point in year 200550 if he or she starts to work in the mining sector.  
The probability differences of informal employment among sectors are 
generally decreasing over time in all models51.  The percentage changes in the 
sectoral informality differentials in the whole period are given in the Table 4.3.2. 
Table 4.3.2 shows us that two sectors, agriculture and construction, 
become more formal relative to the average sector over time. All other sectors also 
tend to converge to the “average sector”; but their formality compared to the 
average sector decreases over time in all models. The highest percentage changes 
are seen in the transportation, construction and wholesale while the changes in 
agriculture and social sector tend to be modest. 
 
 
                                               
50 Since the differences in the probabilities of informal employments are calculated as taking the 
difference from the average sector in each year, we should specify the degree of increase or 
decrease in the percentage point with respect to the related year.  
51 However, in LPM with WLS there is an increase in agriculture sector in 2007 and 2008; but on 
average agriculture has a decreasing trend for with method as well.  
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Table 4.3.2. Percentage change (%) in the informality differentials by sector 
(2000 to 2008) 
Sector LPM Probit 
agr -18 -19 
min 0 8 
manuf 0 6 
cons -41 -47 
whole 40 42 
trans 63 60 
fin 0 0 
other 27 27 
(-) sign shows the decrease in informality  
compared to average sector. 
 
The magnitudes and the related figures of the normalized coefficients show 
us that there are some structural differences between the sectors that cannot be 
explained by workers’ characteristics. In the following section, I will try to 
explore these “structural differences” by using the normalized differentials that are 
derived from the LPM.  
 
4.4.   Determinants of Sectoral Differences in Probability of 
Informal Employment  
In this section, I will try to explore the determinants of the sectoral 
differences in probability of the informal employment. Firstly, I will present a 
short description of the methodology and associated variables that will be used in 
the analysis.  
 
4.4.1.   Estimation Procedure 
In the second part of the thesis, I will analyze for the possible determinants 
of differences of informal employment at the sectoral level. The informality 
differentials that are derived from the first stage (normalized coefficients from 
 43  
LPM) will be pooled overtime and will be regressed on a list of variables which 
are thought to have explanatory power for the sectoral differences of the 
probabilities on informal employment. The following section describes these 
variables that may have affected the extent of informal employment52.  
 
4.4.1.1.   Independent Variables 
 
Independent variables include both a set of sector specific variables and 
aggregate/economy-wide variables. We discuss these two groups in this order. 
Group 1: Sector specific independent variables: 
 
A. Credit availability: There are two possible channels through which the 
availability of credit could affect the level of informality in the economy. First, as 
stated in Catao et al. (2009), if firms have more opportunity to borrow money (if 
they are not credit constrained) they are more likely to grow and shift to the larger 
segments of the market and leave their previous smaller size segment which is 
most probably dominated by informal firms53. The importance of this channel is 
further supported by the evidence pointed out by Catao et al. (2009) regarding the 
prominent role of bank credit in emerging markets. They state that bank credits 
are by far the most important class of regulated financial intermediaries in 
emerging markets and developing countries regarding the provision of external 
                                               
52 Although there are many important variables that may influence the differences of probabilities 
in sectoral informal employment (differences tariff rates, stickiness of controls of legal authorities, 
fines...etc.), the need for the variables on sectoral basis and unavailability of the data restricts us to 
use those in the second stage of the regressions.     
53 It is highly debatable that whether the informality level of the firms affects the amount of credit 
borrowed or the credit they get from the banks affect the level of informality of the firms (Straub 
(2005) claims that informal firms are credit constrained while Catao et al. (2009) support the idea 
that credit constrained firms are more likely to operate informally). As anecdotal evidence, I asked 
a person who is responsible for giving credits to small and medium size enterprises in a well-
known bank for the level of the importance of the operating formally or informally for getting 
credits. As he states, the important thing while giving credits is the probability of repayment; and it 
is mostly decided by looking at firm’s revenue and its credibility. In this manner, it is hardly to say 
that “banks do not give credits to firms which are not paying its workers social security payments”, 
since they are able to get credits if they are profitable and have credibility. 
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credit to firms. The second way in which the availability of bank credit may lead 
to a decrease in the probability of informal employment may occur especially 
when firms are credit constrained (i.e. lack liquidity). If a firm has difficulties in 
paying its debts, it may tend to operate informally in order to avoid the extra legal 
costs of being formal such as social security payments of workers and 
income/corporate taxes. Accordingly, I will use the bank credits extended to the 
sectors as a share of the sector’s GDP as an indicator of credit availability. This 
data series is obtained from the database of the Central Bank of Turkey available 
online. 
B. The gender composition of the industry’s workforce: In the first 
stage analysis, the results suggest that men are more likely to be employed 
formally compared to women. Taking into account that males are generally the 
head of the households and the primary wage earners in the family, one can expect 
that they are more likely to search for formal jobs in order to provide health care 
for the whole family. As such, men are forced to look for formal jobs more 
rigorously than women. Carrying this argument to the sectoral level I will test 
whether the share of male workers in the total workforce of the sector is an 
important indicator influencing the level of informality of the sector54. The data 
for the gender composition of the sectors workforce is obtained from the internet 
site of TURKSTAT, which is derived from the Household Labor Force Surveys. 
C. Sectoral GDP Growth: This variable stands for the performance of the 
related sector. A priori, I expect that high levels of growth rates in the related 
                                               
54 Although share of male workers in each sector is higher compare to share of female workers, 
there are differences between sectors in terms of probability of informal employment even the 
sectors have the same share of male workers. For instance, although construction and mining has 
nearly the same share of male workers in all years (above 95%), mining is more formal compare to 
construction sector. Moreover, manufacturing sector seems to be more formal compare to 
construction even though its share of male workers is less than construction sector. These all 
makes us to control for share of male workers in the sectors in the regressions.   
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sector will induce more employment in the sector, and most likely formally. It is 
because legal authorities may increase their control over the sectors which operate 
well and high levels of production to get more tax revenues. This threat of being 
caught would increase the incidence of formality in the sector55. Additionally, 
people who are working informally may have a stronger bargaining power to 
demand social security coverage from their employers if the sector (or firm) 
operates well and are making profits. Sectoral GDP data is taken from the 
database of the Central Bank of Turkey’s online database. 
D. Number of new foreign firms: The number of new foreign entrants to 
a specific sector can be thought of as possibly increasing the extent of formal 
employment. Since it is more likely for foreign firms to comply with the legal 
framework of the work legislation (especially when they are new entrants), it is 
expected that an increase in the number of foreign firms at the sectoral level will 
boost formal employment in the related sector. Sectoral FDI data is available only 
for the period 2002-2008; and obtained from the database of Undersecretariat of 
Treasury. 
            E.  Price Indices for Tradable and Non-Tradable Sectors: This variable 
stands for the competitiveness effect between markets. I categorize agriculture, 
mining and manufacturing as the tradable sectors, and the remaining sectors as 
non-tradable sectors. The price index for the tradable goods is the producer price 
index and the price index for the nontradables is the consumer price index56. I 
think that the increase in the price index of a specific group will increase the 
profitability of the sector, and this may increase the tendency of firms operating in 
                                               
55 There are some models using the probability of being caught as a source for increasing the 
incidence of formality. See Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) among others. 
56 The literature widely uses these indices as proxies for tradable and non-tradable good. See 
Jha(2003).  
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that sector to hire more formal workers. This data is taken from International 
Finance Statistics (IFS) Database of the IMF. 
Group 2: Economy-wide variables 
A. GDP growth: When the economy is operating well, firms may tend to 
employ people more formally (probably they hire more formal workers or they 
employ existing informal workers as formal). It is because (in the same argument 
with sectoral growth rates of GDP), government is more likely to increase the 
number of inspections related with the informality levels of the firms and workers 
are expected to be more courageous to demand social security coverage compared 
to periods when the economy performs bad. The data is taken from the database of 
the Central Bank of Turkey’s online database. 
B. Real exchange rate: An increase in the real effective exchange rate 
may increase the tendency of firms to employ people informally. This can be 
attributed to competitiveness pressures on the sectors; with depreciation in the 
domestic currency, firms now selling their goods cheaper and this decreases unit 
revenue from the goods sold.  In this manner, firms may try to increase their 
profits by hiring more informal workers. The data is from the database of the 
Central Bank of Turkey’s online database. 
 
4.4.1.2.    The Second Stage Estimation Procedure 
The regression I am going to estimate at this stage of the analysis is as 
follows: 
 
ipjt=TjtβE+DjtβD+ujt   (6) 
where ip stands for the informality differential, Tjt is a vector of independent 
sectoral based variables enlisted above and Djt is a vector of industry and/or time 
specific fixed effects.   
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It is important to note that controlling for the worker characteristics in the 
first stage provides us second stage results that are driven only by the sectoral 
characteristics of the differentials and time effects. In estimating the regression 
with a panel dataset we first would use the Hausman test to choose between the 
fixed and random effect models. However, the Hausman Test is not valid when 
there is (group wise) heteroskedasticity and cross sectional serial correlation in the 
error terms of the panel data57. In order to check whether there exist 
heteroskedasticity problems which will prevent us from using the Hausman Test, I 
used the Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity58. The results suggest that 
there is a highly significant test statistics which points to a strong groupwise 
heteroskedasticity59. Moreover, to check whether there is serial autocorrelation in 
the panel data60, Wooldridge’s test for serial correlation is used61. The test results 
for serial correlation states that the panel data also has a serial correlation problem 
across panels. Since our data has both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
problems62 which prevent us using the Hausman Test to choose between fixed 
effect model and random effect model, I will use the FGLS method to estimate the 
equation. The reason for choosing FGLS is that Stock and Watson (2003) states 
                                               
57 See Li (2006) and discussions at http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2009-07/msg00099.html. 
58 See Khachatyrn et al. (2005) for a more detailed explanation on the application of the test.  
59 At 5% significance level. 
60At 5% significance level. Because serial correlation in linear panel-data models biases the 
standard errors and causes the results to be less efficient. Because of this problem, researchers 
need to identify serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term in a panel-data model (see 
Drucker (2003)). 
61 Drucker (2002) praises this test since it can be applied under general conditions (for example the 
test automatically conditional on heteroskedasticity) and is easy to implement. 
62 I check fort he serial correlation and heteroskedasticity for each model in the tables which will 
be presented below and each of them has both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (at 5% 
significance level).  
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that it performs best when the errors are heteroscedastic and/or correlated across 
observations63. The results of the FGLS regressions are given in Table 4.4.1.2. 
The regression results show us that amount of bank credit over sectoral 
GDP share, male worker share of the sector and real growth real of the sector are 
significant in determining the difference in the probability of informal 
employment in each model. The sign and the significance of male share variable is 
an expected result because from the first stage results we also have found that 
male workers tend to work more formally than female workers. Being head of the 
household, in general, of the family, forces men to work formally and the 
dominance of men workers in the related sector increases the probability of 
informal employment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
63 See Khachatyrn et al. (2005). Moreover, FGLS also allows estimation in the presence of 
autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and/or heteroskedasticity across 
panels (see also in Biorn (2010)). There is also a debate on the literature suggesting that in the 
presence of both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation one should use the method which is 
designed by Katz and Beck (1995). Based on MLE simulations, Katz and Beck (1995) suggest that 
their alternative “panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) method” performs well compare to 
FGLS. However, a more recent article by Chen et al. (2010) finds that the FGLS method is 
generally more efficient than the method of Katz and Beck (1995) even if the units and time period 
is small (For instance they find that out of 8 panel data set, only in one of them PCSE performs 
well when N=5 and T=10). Based on their suggestion, I prefer to use FGLS in the estimation 
process of panel data.  
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Table 4.4.1.2. Regression Results with Feasible Generalized Least Square 
(FGLS) 
Variable Feasible Generalized Least Square 
 I II III IV V 
constant 
 
-0.185*** 
(0.009) 
0.287*** 
(0.047) 
0.31*** 
(0.068) 
0.328*** 
(0.069) 
0.22*** 
(0.096) 
credit 
 
-0.059*** 
(0.014) 
-0.098*** 
(0.020) 
-0.099*** 
(0.019) 
-0.121*** 
(0.018) 
-0.147*** 
(0.027) 
male_comp 
 
- -0.66*** 
(0.062) 
-0.66*** 
(0.061) 
-0.66*** 
(0.055) 
-0.69*** 
(0.083) 
price_ind 
 
- - -0.000582 
(0.00013) 
-0.00009 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
sec_growth 
 
- - - 
 
-0.059*** 
(0.018) 
-0.063*** 
(0.023) 
no_firms64 
 
- - - 
 
- 0.000009 
(0.00008) 
Time 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Sector 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of 
Observations 
72 72 72 72 72 
Time periods 9 9 9 9 9 
Number of 
Groups 
8 8 8 8 8 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** indicates 1% significance level. 
 
The regression results also suggest that real growth of the sector is an 
important determinant of probability of informal employment in the related sector. 
Moreover, the sign of the growth rate coefficient is also negative implying that if a 
sector performs well (higher sectoral GDP growth rates), then probability of 
informal employment in that sector decreases. This result complies with my 
expectations related with the effect of growth of the sector; people may be braver 
to demand social security coverage when the firm is operating well and/or 
government becomes stricter in control of the informality in the well-performing 
                                               
64 It is questionable whether foreign firms enter to sectors especially which are more formal due to 
avoid competitiveness pressures of those informal firms in the same sector, or their entrance 
increases the formality of the sector.  Since our number of new foreign firms is insignificant, there 
is no need for further search of the endogeneity.  
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sectors so that firms are more likely to provide social security coverage to 
workers. 
The credit variable, which is our main concern, is significant and negative 
in all of the regressions. Complying with the claims of Catao et al. (2009), 
regression results implies that credit availability to firm/sectors is one of the 
determinants of the probability of working formally or informally. The magnitude 
of the coefficient is increasing as we control for more variables and reaches to -
0.147 in the fifth regression. The magnitude of the credit variable in the fifth 
regression suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the credit over sectoral 
GDP ratio decreases the probability of being informal by approximately 0.15 
percentage points (i.e. 0.0015) in the given industry. Although the variable is 
statistically significant economically it seems somewhat insignificant. 
Additionally, in all regressions coefficients of the price index and the number of 
foreign firms are not significant, even in 10% significance level in determining the 
probability differences in informal employment of the sectors.  
The year and sector dummies are included in all regressions to control for 
time fixed effects and sector specific effects. The problem is that even the sector 
dummies are significant in all regressions; year dummies are hardly so. In order to 
capture business cycle effects, I next use the real growth rate of GDP 
(gdp_growth-for capturing the performance of the overall economy) and changes 
in the real effective exchange rate (eff_ex-in order to control for the 
competitiveness of the economy in the world market). The variables of price index 
and number of foreign firms are not used in the second stage since they are all 
insignificant in first regressions which are presented in Table 4.4.1.2. The new 
regression results with the additional variables are presented in the Table 4.4.1.3. 
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Table 4.4.1.3. Feasible Generalized Least Square Regressions with additional 
variables of Real GDP Growth and Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 Feasible Generalized Least Square 
Variable I II III IV 
constant 
 
0.28*** 
(0.014) 
0.29*** 
(0.022) 
0.30*** 
(0.022) 
0.30*** 
(0.022) 
credit 
 
-0.035*** 
(0.006) 
-0.040*** 
(0.009) 
-0.042*** 
(0.010) 
-0.044*** 
(0.011) 
male_comp 
 
-0.68*** 
(0.018) 
-0.68*** 
(0.028) 
-0.70*** 
(0.029) 
-0.71*** 
(0.031) 
sec_growth 
 
- -0.027*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
gdp_growth 
 
- - -0.019 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
eff_ex 
 
- - - 0.00006 
(0.005) 
agr 
 
0.38*** 
(0.016) 
0.37*** 
(0.016) 
0.37*** 
(0.016) 
0.37*** 
(0.016) 
min 
 
0.11*** 
(0.007) 
0.11*** 
(0.010) 
0.11*** 
(0.010) 
0.11*** 
(0.010) 
manuf 
 
0.097*** 
(0.005) 
0.10*** 
(0.006) 
0.10*** 
(0.006) 
0.10*** 
(0.007) 
cons 
 
0.56*** 
(0.013) 
0.57*** 
(0.015) 
0.57*** 
(0.015) 
0.57*** 
(0.015) 
whole 
 
0.28*** 
(0.007) 
0.28*** 
(0.009) 
0.28*** 
(0.009) 
0.29*** 
(0.009) 
trans 
 
0.30*** 
(0.005) 
0.31*** 
(0.007) 
0.31*** 
(0.007) 
0.31*** 
(0.008) 
fin 
 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
0.028*** 
(0.006) 
Number of 
Observatio
ns 
72 72 72 72 
Time 
periods 
9 9 9 9 
Number of 
Groups 
8 8 8 8 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** indicates 1% 
significance level. * indicates 10% significance level. 
 
 
The results are similar for the same variables in both tables. The sign and 
significance of the coefficients of the credit and share of male variable (the effect 
on the probability of informal employment) do not change (although coefficients 
decrease in magnitude).  In all of the regressions (regressions in Table 4.4.1.2 and 
Table 4.4.1.3), high significance levels of sector dummy coefficients indicate that 
there are some sector specific fixed effects beyond the sector specific control 
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variables included in the regressions. Although it is not reported, the correlation 
between the real growth of the overall economy and the real growth rate of the 
sectoral GDPs seem to be correlated (correlation is above 0.6). For this reason, I 
also run regressions III and IV with real growth rate of the GDP of the overall 
economy alone (eliminating the sectoral growth rate variable and the results 
suggest that GDP growth rate of the economy is also negative and significant at 5 
significance).  This result supports the expectations and result suggests that an 
increase in the real GDP growth decreases the probability of informal 
employment. This result complies with our argument that when the economy is 
operating well, firms tend to employ people more formally (probably they hire 
more formal workers or they employ existing informal workers as formal). The 
coefficient of real effective exchange rate has a positive sign but it is not 
significant.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis examines two things: the formal and informal employment 
probabilities and determinants of the differences of probabilities of informal 
employment across the sectors. The thesis suggests that there are significant 
differences among sectors in terms of probabilities of informal employment. 
While agriculture and construction sectors are found to be the most informal 
sectors, mining and financial sectors are the most formal ones. Additionally, after 
controlling for business cycle and sector specific effects, male worker share, bank 
credit volume to sectors and sectoral real growth rates are found to be significant 
determinants of the probability differences of the sectors in terms of formal and 
informal employment. The results suggest that higher shares of working men, 
higher bank credits over sectoral GDP ratio and higher real GDP growth of the 
sector increase the tendency of formal employment.  
Utilizing the LFHS data for the period 2000-2008, I used the social 
security registration information as an indicator for informality in the economy. 
Applying the two stage methodology of Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003), I 
decompose the worker’s characteristics and working sector properties of 
probability of informal employment. The first stage regressions suggest that male 
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workers are more likely to be employed formally compared to female workers. 
The possibility of married people to be employed formally is higher than the 
single ones as well. Moreover, people who work in urban areas, probably due to 
the variety of job opportunities, are more likely to be employed formally 
compared to people who work in rural areas. Education also increases the 
probability of formal employment; people with more education are less likely to 
be employed informally compared to those who have less education. Lastly, 
younger people are more likely to be employed informally compared to elder 
people. According the findings from the regressions in the first stage, the policies 
to increase the education and skill level of the people are appropriate to decrease 
the level of informally working people in each sector.     
In the first stage, the coefficients of the sector dummies (informality 
differentials) are used properly to create an average measure of the total 
informality in Turkey. Sectoral differences, which are called normalized 
informality differentials, are evaluated based on the difference from the average 
sector.  This discussion allows me to identify the decreasing trend of the 
probability of informal employment by looking at the average sector over the 
period 2000-2008.  
In the second stage, I pool the normalized informality differentials across 
time and regress these differentials on many variables which may have 
explanatory power on the differences of probability of informal employment of 
the sectors. Applying feasible generalized least square method on the panel data 
and after controlling for business cycle and sector specific effects,  I find that the 
share of the male workers and credit availability to the sector (over the sector’s 
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GDP) have significant explanatory powers in explaining the differences in the 
probability of informal employment across sectors.  
The results of the thesis are important in two ways: first, this thesis 
suggests that differences in informal employment probabilities of the sectors are 
obvious and these differences do not only stem from the worker’s characteristics. 
This finding is crucial for policy implications since the results suggest that 
policies, which concentrate only on the human capital and education of the people, 
will not solve the informality problem totally in the whole economy. Although my 
regression analysis are based on the sectoral differences, the regression results 
suggest that as one sector has more chance to get credits, the probability of formal 
employment level of the sector is likely to increase. In this manner, one of the 
sector-based issues of the solution to prevent sectoral based informality is to 
increase the credit opportunities to firms. 
Policies, which help to increase the availability of credits to people as well 
as firms, are also likely to stimulate the formal job opportunities in the economy.  
Those operating in the informal economy have limited access to finance and, as a 
consequence, fewer opportunities to expand their business or respond to 
opportunities, or improve productivity. Lack of collateral can freeze many 
informal operators out of formal credit institutions65. From this point of view, it is 
important to mention about the appropriateness of the microcredit policies in 
Turkey. Increasing the micro credits, which is regarded as an instrument for to 
enhance the income in the socio-economically depressed areas by providing 
financial support to the micro and small enterprises66 may be one of the workable 
                                               
65 See the report on Informal Economy by International Organization of Employers in 2006. 
66 See Karataş and Helvacığlu (2008). 
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solutions, at least to some degree, to increase the number of formal works in the 
economy.  
I think that there are many other issues that should be taken into 
consideration while approaching the sectoral differences in the informal 
employment among sectors. For example, if there are loose tendencies of the legal 
authorities to specific sectors in terms of the punishment system, it is highly likely 
that firms operating in that sector will employ people more informally. 
Additionally, the power of lobbies related to specific sectors can be one of the 
main reasons of the differences of the informal employment tendencies among 
sectors. The above analysis should be further enriched to capture taxes, measures 
of costs of incompliance with regulation and several other sector specific 
measures, which remains an agenda for future research. 
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